SINCE 1979, union contract concessions have occurred with increasing frequency. Substantial press attention has been devoted to these concessions along with other ills plaguing organized labor such as the declining proportion of union members in the work force and political difficulties with the Reagan administration. Popular accounts of these trends often suggest that a turning point in union wage determination and industrial relations has been reached.
negative. Similar episodes have occurred in the past, and these experiences suggest that permanent and fundamental changes in wage-determination processes are unlikely to occur in the absence of external intervention. Second, could the government intervene during the current concession episode to make useful reforms in wage-setting processes that would increase the responsiveness of wage adjustments to the business cycle? It is suggested that the adoption of "gain sharing" plans (such as profit sharing) in some current concession situations is a tendency that the government might encourage. Third, could possible spillovers from the current union concessions lead to widespread moderation in wage change throughout the economy? Traditional channels of wage imitation are outlined in an effort to answer this. However, preliminary evidence suggests that spillover outside the traditional channels had not occurred as of early 1982. Tables 1 and 2 report the effects of unionization on wage trends since the mid-1950s. Until the mid-1970s, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics did not provide separate data on union and nonunion wages. Hence table 1 relies on a division of the work force into industries with above-average and below-average unionization rates to estimate differences between union and nonunion wage increases. The wage differential widened from the end of the Korean War until the mid-1970s. For the 1976-81 period, direct data on union and nonunion wage trends are available and appear in table 2. These show a continued widening of the union-nonunion wage gap. The expanding union-nonunion wage differential could help explain a number of phenomena affecting unions. These include the relative shrinkage in the size of the union sector and the increasing hostility to new organization on the part of management about which unions have complained in recent years. From the perspective of wage determination, however, the widening gap may have created economic forces requiring readjustments of the wage structure. Where the union wage premium has widened, competitive pressures from the nonunion or foreign sectors have presumably grown. Such pressures originating in product markets will eventually reduce job opportunities for union workers and create pressures for wage concessions.
Long-Run Influences on Union Contract Concessions

Short-Run Developments
Wage equations suggest that a widening union-nonunion wage gap would have a modest impact on wage inflation. My earlier Brookings study indicates that the widening of the gap reflected in table 2 would subtract about 0.5 to 0.8 percentage point from the rate of union wage change by 1982.1 However, such an effect has not been widespread. Thebe less than two million, with the largest groups in the automobile and intercity trucking industries.
It was clear from the descriptions of the forty-six instances of concessions that imminent closing of plants, layoffs, and bankruptcies motivated the agreements. In some cases, when management's demands for concessions were rejected, steps were taken to cut back production and employment. These steps sometimes produced worker acquiescence. In a number of instances, the wage concessions were "sweetened" by implementation of a profit-sharing plan whereby workers would gain if the economic health of the employer was eventually restored. Instances of worker ownership or partial ownership were also reported. In some cases, wage increases were suspended or a portion of current wages was "put aside." This may have been intended by the union to indicate that the wage rates were merely in some ill-defined limbo from which they would emerge in better times. Several settlements provided explicit guarantees of job security or agreements for advance warning of future layoffs.
Some of the employers affected, such as automobile and tire manufacturers, were particularly hurt by the poor economic performance of their industries since 1979. Others, such as the newspapers and meat packing industries, may have been victims of long-run trends that were, at most, aggravated by the weakness in the general economy. In three cases, Chrysler Corporation, Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), and the Chicago-Milwaukee Railroad, the federal government was involved in imposing the concessions. Competition arising from deregulation adversely affected employers in the trucking and airlines industries. And import competition has grown in several segments of manufacturing.
Along with the concessions there has been much talk about worker enlistment by management in improving productivity, worker participation in management, and the quality of working life. For example, a union representative was placed on the board of directors of Chrysler; similar moves were initiated at American Motors Corporation but were stymied by antitrust problems. A peculiar blend of cooperative rhetoric and toughness has emanated from management. Management has been able to take a hard line-"take a cut or we close the plant." But there has also been discussion in industrial relations circles of the need to end the "adversary relationship." Experience has varied when the issues of concessions have arisen. In some cases workers vetoed concessions and were laid off. In other cases, the desires of local workers were not honored by national unions concerned with maintaining the integrity of industry-wide contracts. And despite the concessions that did occur, there was a substantial increase in unemployment among union workers after 1979.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that in 1981 about 67,000 workers who negotiated in 1981 received first-year wage cuts or freezes . At the same time, roughly 160,000 apparel workers experienced unscheduled reopenings-justified on the grounds of unanticipated inflationthat led to extra pay increases. The net effect of all these developments had little overall impact during 1981 when the average wage adjustment negotiated, including those for workers experiencing freezes and cuts, was more than 10 percent.3
Concessions in the Trucking and Automobile Industries
Wage concessions in the intercity trucking industry and at the Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation in the automobile industry have received by far the greatest amount of public attention. Nominally, the new International Brotherhood of Teamsters' National Master Freight Agreement covered about 300,000 workers, although large layoffs in the trucking industry make the estimate uncertain. The new 1982 contract was officially negotiated early; it was concluded two months before the old contract would have expired on March 31. In principle, the union refused to reopen the previous agreement, but since the new one superseded the old, the result was equivalent to a premature reopening. The Teamsters' concessions were negotiated against a background of federal deregulation of the trucking industry, a structural change that permitted entry of nonunion competition. During the final year of the old agreement it was widely reported that many trucking employers were paying less than contractual wages with apparent acquiescence from local Teamsters unions.
Under the new agreement no general wage increases are provided. The escalator clause is continued at the previous formula of one cent for each increase of 0.3 point in the consumer price index. This formula provides a little more than 70 percent protection of the real wage in early 1982, so that the contract involves a real wage decrease. Moreover, the frequency of escalator payments is reduced from semiannual to annual and provision is made for diversion of increases arising from the escalator to go into various fringe benefits. Such diversions, which are left to the discretion of a labor-management committee, could in theory eliminate all wage increases coming from the escalator, except for a specified component of the initial increment due on April 1, 1982. Work-rule restrictions were relaxed to permit greater employer flexibility in arranging pickups and deliveries. In return for these concessions, employers in the trucking industry agreed not to operate nonunion subsidiaries. About 700,000 workers in the automobile industry, many of them on layoff, were estimated to be covered by the "big three" concession agreements. The Ford and General Motors settlements, which superseded the existing contract and extended to September 1984, eliminated the 3 percent annual improvement factor and froze wages by delaying escalator payments. Both automobile agreements, following the Chrysler example, included profit-sharing plans. And both addressed job security concerns of the union by providing certain income guarantees for workers with seniority and various assurances with regard to future plant closings. Both agreements provide for early reopening in the event that automobile sales return to the high levels achieved in the late 1970s.
Because their escalator is more generous than the Teamsters' formula (over 90 percent protection), and because the diversion of escalator money will be less in the automobile industry than in the trucking industry, real wages will decline less for Ford and General Motors workers than for truckers. However, certain similarities between the automobile and trucking concessions are noteworthy. First, in the absence of declines in the CPI, both concessions eliminate the possibility of real wage improvements. Second, both attempt to retain the principle of escalation and of multiyear agreements. Third, both provide for reopening if conditions improve, a signal that the concessions should be regarded as temporary, even if the reopener is not triggered.
Some Historical Perspectives
The concessions made by unions since 1979 are unusual enough to attract media attention, but they are by no means unprecedented. Groups of concessions, over a relatively short period, have been known to occur in the past. Obviously during the Great Depression wage cuts were common. It is more useful, however, to look to the post-World War II period since modern institutions of collective bargaining had developed by that time. Two postwar episodes can be identified, one occurring right after the Korean War and the other in the late 1950s and early An earlier version of this paper, available from the author, contains detailed references.
THE POST-KOREAN WAR EPISODE
Immediately after the Korean War, union wages were cut in the garment and textile industries. These cuts occurred during a period of recession and slight decreases in consumer prices. Often they were not readily accepted and were preceded by strikes or imposed by arbitrators. Although escalator clauses today often do not provide for wage decreases in response to price decreases, some of those existing in the early 1950s were symmetrical. As a result, some unionized workers did experience reductions in that part of their wage arising from cost-of-living allowances during and after the Korean War. The fact that escalators could no longer be counted on to raise wages may have contributed to their reduced popularity. However, the common practice of separating the basic wage and the cost-of-living allowance tended to cushion the psychological impact; the official wage was not cut, just the allowance.
Other developments in the post-Korean War period are reminiscent of recent events. In some cases, notably at Studebaker Corporation, workers rejected wage cuts negotiated by their unions. Sometimes such rejections were followed by plant closings. In other cases, concessions were more artfully packaged-as at Kaiser-Willys Incorporated-and were accepted. Although there were often confrontations over concessions, there were also instances of labor-management cooperation. At times, employees purchased stock in the companies, and unions provided financial assistance. Unions and management in distressed industries issued common appeals for governmental regulations that would increase employment. The frequency of strikes declined to a six-year low. In some instances unions permitted deviations from previous patternsetting arrangements to accommodate individual employers.
The 1953-54 recession also produced demands for job-security arrangements. In some cases unions were able to obtain only vague assurances of continued production. At the major automobile firms and in other industries more dramatic concessions were obtained from management. For many years there had been talk of a guaranteed annual wage for blue collar workers that would shield their incomes from the ups and down of production. Proposals for employment guarantees go back at least to the 1920s, and a scattering of such plans existed before World War II. In 1955 a breakthrough occurred in automobiles and other industries when the modern supplemental unemployment benefits plan (SUB) was inaugurated. The income guarantees achieved during the 1982 concessions at Ford and General Motors are in effect "superSUBs," which can be seen as extensions of these earlier plans.
THE PERIOD
OF "MANAGEMENT HARDENING" Table 1 The main lesson from the two past episodes of union concessions is that the dramatic changes are largely transitory. For example, the shift to a one-year contract cycle in the steel industry and the abandonment of escalation lasted only a few years. Such a shift had the potential of making wages more sensitive to short-term real economic fluctuations. It also carried the risk of more frequent exposure to strikes. In the era of cooperation that existed in the early 1960s, labor and management in the steel industry could live with this risk. Over time, however, the cooperative spirit eroded. The incumbent president of the Steelworkers was voted out partly on the grounds that he had been too cooperative with management. As cooperation became less certain, the logic of the multiyear escalated contract reasserted itself. In other industries similar developments occurred. The three pioneering plans at Armour, Kaiser Steel, and in West Coast longshoring described above ceased to exist. As employment expanded in the late 1960s, the sense of crisis that brought those plans into existence evaporated.
Wage Outcomes of the 1973-75 Recession
Both the post-Korean War period and the period from the late 1950s to early 1960s produced concessions against a background of economic slack. But not all recessions have produced such dramatic effects. In particular, the severe recession that began in late 1973 did not produce concessions in the large union settlements that receive prominent press attention. The fact that concessions were not widely observed at that time may have contributed to the impression that union wages are wholly insulated from market pressures.
It is argued below that wage experience of the major union contracts during the 1973-75 recession is largely explained by accidents of timing with regard to expiration and renegotiation of long-term contracts, the use of escalation during a period of oil-shock inflation, and the failure of the 1973-75 recession to produce widespread threats of permanent job loss to senior workers. While the period of recent contract concessions beginning in 1979 opened with certain similarities to the 1973-75 experience, the primary difference between the two periods was the greater threat to senior workers in the recent period.
It should be noted that there were a few instances of concessions and shifts in wage behavior during the 1973-75 recession and its aftermath. In the newspaper industry contracts were reached between printers and owners in New York City and Washington, D.C., which provided for an end to restrictive work rules in exchange for "lifetime" job guarantees and early retirement bonuses. Similar arrangements were later worked out for commercial printers. Union wage settlements in construction soared after federal wage controls were lifted in early 1974, but scattered wage freezes, wage reductions, and work-rule modifications were subsequently reported. Wage reductions were also reported in the airline industry. As in the current period, management was sometimes able to win concessions by tying them to the introduction of profit sharing.
Probably the most dramatic shifts in the behavior of union wages came in the public sector. In the late 1960s and early 1970s a significant body of opinion held that the public could not "take" a strike of government employees and that, therefore, unions in the public sector could be expected to negotiate exceptionally large wage settlements. In some government sectors wages did rise more rapidly than in private employment during the late 1960s. However, by the mid-1970s, the New York City fiscal crisis provoked a series of wage freezes and other concessions. It has been argued that New York City's problems had a demonstration effect on wage settlements in other municipalities.6
The general slump in productivity improvement after 1973 also may have influenced some major contract settlements. It is true that union wages were more insulated from the productivity decline than nonunion wages. But there was some erosion in the wage increase formula of the "3 percent plus escalator" originally enshrined in the 1948 General Motors contract. Since escalators generally provide less than 100 percent protection against inflation, high rates of price increase erode the real value of the 3 percent factor. Beginning in the automobile industry in 1973, and then in automotive parts, metals, apparel, and other industries, escalator "diversions" became commonplace. Typically these consisted of putting some part of the wage increase specified by the escalator into the financing of some benefit, often pension improvements. In the 1979 automobile settlements the 3 percent factor was further eroded by applying it to the base wage excluding the cost-of-living allowance.
It is true, nonetheless, that during the 1973-75 recession wage concessions were less visible than has been the case recently. Table 3 tracks a selected group of major union negotiations during 1973-81. The actual wage increases under settlements reached during 1973-78 are given. Thereafter, 10 percent price inflation is assumed for estimating the increases achieved under escalated contracts. Settlements with relatively low rates of increase in 1973 (electrical, petroleum, tires, and trucking) were negotiated during the first half of the year. Although inflation had begun accelerating from the low point reached in 1972, the rate of inflation that had been achieved earlier may have moderated these initial settlements. In addition, wage and price controls were still in effect.
The larger settlements reached later in 1973 (meat packing and automobile industries) were concluded in a period when it was clear that inflation was accelerating and wage-price controls were being lifted. In 1974, inflation as measured by the CPI reached a then post-World War II peak, and wage-price controls were terminated. The 1974 settlements reflect these inflationary pressures.
It is evident from table 3 that the existence of an escalator clause in contracts negotiated in 1973-74 made a large difference in the wage increase actually received. The 1973 contracts providing the lowest rates of wage increase either had no escalator (petroleum refining, tires) or had escalators with "caps" that prevented inflation above a specified level from influencing wage adjustments (electrical equipment and trucking). In 1974 petroleum proved an exception to this generalization. Although the nonescalated contract did not expire until 1975 and contained no reopener clause, the oil companies agreed to an unscheduled 6 percent wage increase on top of what the contract specified for the second year. At the time, the substantial boost in OPEC prices had dramatically raised oil industry profits; gasoline shortages had occurred; and the industry was not in a position to play the hard-hearted employer.
The importance of escalator adjustments to wages in the union sector is clear from table 4. Since 1973 one-fifth to one-third of the annual wage adjustment experienced in the major union sector (private agreements There is a long history in labor economics of attempts to model union wage setting. Many of these models basically picture the union as a labor-supplying firm that faces a demand curve (the derived demand for labor) and that maximizes some goal under that constraint. Such models are misleading because they suggest that a "marginalist" approach well describes union behavior. The union is pictured as facing a wageemployment trade-off (the downward-sloping demand curve for labor) and as making incremental adjustments to obtain the optimum mix of the two "goods," wage rate and employment.
An obvious issue raised by a marginalist approach is the degree to which a wage-employment trade-off exists, especially in the short run. If the elasticity of labor demand is low, senior workers would have to sacrifice a lot in wages to produce small gains in job security for their junior counterparts. Estimates of elasticities of labor demand are not available, although some research suggests that unions face inelastic demand curves. Examination of the ratio of labor costs to total costs can provide an indication of the degree of demand elasticity ;7 such estimates are provided below for 1972, the year preceding the 1973-75 recession. Assuming no substitution of other factors for labor in the short run, and assuming labor costs pass through to prices, the percentage reduction in price that could result from a reduction in labor costs is simply the ratio of labor costs to total cost multiplied by the percentage reduction in labor cost. That is, a labor cost ratio of 20 percent suggests that a 10 percent wage cut could translate into a 2 percent price reduction. The output effect can be estimated as the product elasticity of demand for the employer's output multiplied by the price reduction.
The list above shows that the labor cost ratio was 33 percent or less in the steel, petroleum, automobile, meat packing, and tire industries. Relatively high ratios appear in the telephone and coal mining industries, in which there was increased output during the 1973-75 recession, and in trucking, in which regulation then held down nonunion competition. Only in electrical equipment was there a relatively high ratio (still below 50 percent) and no insulation from recession. Generally if unions were 8. For the electrical equipment, automobile, and coal mining industries the figures shown are employee compensation per dollar of industry output (excluding intraindustry consumption) for input-output industries with SIC code numbers 53 through 58, 59, and 7, respectively. The figure for trucking is compensation per dollar of operating revenue for class 1 motor carriers. The telephone estimate refers to wages and salaries of the Bell System divided by operating revenue; this ratio was then multiplied by the ratio of compensation to wages and salaries from the national income accounts for telephone and telegraph. For the petroleum, meat packing, tire, and steel industries the ratio of payroll to shipments (for SIC codes 291, 301, and 331) was multiplied by the ratio of compensation to wage and salary for the corresponding two-digit industry in the national income accounts. To adjust for intraindustry shipments, the ratio of such shipments to total industry output was calculated from the 1972 input-output "use" table for industries with SIC codes 31.01,14.0101 through 14.0104, 32.01, and 37.0101 through 37.0105. sensitive to marginal wage-employment trade-offs, they might have found few gains at the margin from wage concessions due to low elasticities in the demand for labor.
In principle unions might have raised the effective elasticities to unity by making combination deals involving wage concessions and employment guarantees. As a first approximation, an employer might be indifferent between a 10 percent layoff and a 10 percent wage cut (below what wages would otherwise be). Either adjustment cuts payroll by the same 10 percent. But even assuming that a one-for-one trade-off could be obtained, it might not be acceptable to the union, given its political process.
There is recent recognition in the literature on labor economics that union decisionmaking responds to senior workers who are inframarginal with regard to layoffs, largely due to the seniority systems that they themselves helped to impose. Unless the "median voter's" job is threatened, concessions would simply produce income reductions for the majority in exchange for extra employment for the minority. As is noted below, this political calculus might be altered by changing the incentives for gain-sharing plans. But without such incentives, majority altruism is unlikely to produce wage flexibility.
Thus unless there are imminent threats of bankruptcy or permanent plant closings-crisis situations that threaten senior workers-it is unlikely that union wage behavior will be strongly sensitive to recessions. The 1973-75 recession created job losses, but not a sense that those losses would be permanent unless they were remedied by a wage concession. In 1973 the target automobile company chosen by the UAW to set the wage pattern for the "big three" was Chrysler. Clearly at that time the union did not perceive Chrysler to be a marginal firm whose existence might be threatened by a strike, as was the case in 1979.
Bargaining after the 1973-75 Recession
The trough of the 1973-75 recession was reached in early 1975. Table 5 shows that output rose during 1975-76 in all but one of the industries included in the table. Such output gains translated into employment gains except in the telephone industry, in which the long-term rate of rapid productivity improvement continued, and in the tire industry, in which a lengthy strike reduced the annual employment totals. There was every reason for bargainers to believe in 1976 and 1977 that the employment outlook was bright.
Although inflation slowed markedly in 1976, union negotiators had recently weathered an extremely inflationary period. Demands were made in 1976 and 1977 for escalator clauses when none existed and for the removal of caps on escalators that had such provisions. Except for the petroleum workers, who remained on two-year contracts, the demands were met. An escalator was added to the tire contracts (see table 3) and the cap was removed in trucking. A cap was also removed in electrical equipment, although the new escalator was qualified by a "corridor."9 Management at General Electric Company, the lead company in the electrical negotiations, apparently decided in 1976 that improved relations with its unions was a matter of priority.
Of the industries in table 5, the only one in which an escalator was dropped from a contract was coal mining. The coal industry has a history of difficult labor relations, and a prolonged strike ensued when its contract expired in 1977, marked by several tentative settlements and rejections during which the fate of the escalator teetered uncertainly. In the eventual settlement in 1978, although the escalator was removed, one component of the wage increase was labeled as cost-of-living adjustment.
The climate during 1976-79 generally favored an acceleration of wage settlements. Employment was rising and price inflation was accelerating. In early 1978 the Carter administration proposed a voluntary price and wage deceleration program. The administration also became convinced-apparently erroneously-that an energy emergency was being created by the coal strike and attempted to obtain a Taft-Hartley injunction. When this attempt failed, the public perceived the administration as having been unable to influence a major settlement, although technically the 1978 settlement did represent a wage deceleration from the previous contract. 9. A corridor in an escalator clause is a provision that a certain amount of inflation will be ignored in calculating the adjustment. In the case of electrical equipment, a corridor added in 1976 provided that the escalator would reflect inflation up to 7 percent a year and above 9 percent a year with no credit for the interval between 7 and 9 percent. See Current Wage Developments, vol. 28 (July 1976), p. 1.
The administration subsequently announced a more formal program with a 7 percent guideline for wage increases. The evidence on the effect of this program on aggregate price and wage indexes is mixed. It is even more difficult to judge its impact on individual contracts, although some agreements were explicitly tied to the guidelines. There did appear to be an initial impact on the petroleum contracts in early 1979. Although the first-year adjustment exceeded 7 percent, over the contracts' two-year duration the annual increase would have averaged about 7 percent. The parties, however, inserted a reopener clause for the beginning of the second year and raised wages further when the guidelines were liberalized in 1980. Table 3 shows the annual rate of wage change in the escalated contracts for the period beginning in 1979, assuming a 10 percent annual rate of CPI inflation. Although all settlements exceeded the nominal 7 percent standard (and the 7.5 to 9.5 percent standard developed later for 1980 contracts), many of the contracts met the technical requirements of the guidelines. Under the guidelines program, escalated increases were calculated prospectively under modest inflation assumptions. This procedure was initially adopted to encourage escalation at a time when the administration anticipated a slowdown in inflation. In the case of the Teamsters' contract, the administration also made various rule changes permitting certain components of the settlement to be excluded from the computation. In other cases such as in the automobile industry, the administration found the settlement to be acceptable after a stipulation from the employer not to pass the full cost into prices.
To some extent the period beginning in 1979 resembled the early phases of the 1973-75 episode. A second OPEC shock led to sharp oil price increases. Oil price controls and turmoil in Iran combined to produce a gasoline shortage. This, then, turned American consumers away from large domestically built cars, causing particular distress in the automobile and tire industries. Initially damage was sectoral and might well have been perceived as a temporary aberration.
The tire contracts expired in April. By that time there had been sharp increases in gasoline prices, which might have suggested tough times ahead for the tire industry. If such a situation was foreseen, however, its effect seemed to be a weakening of management. In March, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company announced that it would pull out of the industry's mutual assistance pact that provided aid to employers suffer-ing from strikes and promised the United Rubber Workers that it would accept whatever was negotiated with the other companies in return for a no-strike pledge.
As in 1973, the onset of recession came too late to influence several of the 1979 settlements. Its major impact was seen in the Chrysler case, but even the Chrysler outcome was largely dictated by Congress, as the price of loan guarantees, and then by the loan authorities. Two major contracts in 1980 in the telephone and steel industries show little evidence of the recession. In the case of the telephone industry, employment expanded in 1979-80. The Communications Workers, the major union in the industry, noted at the time of the negotiations that the economic outlook was "confused."10 The steel industry was again negotiating early under the ENA, and the "3-percent-plus-escalator" rule was already embedded in that arrangement. In fact, despite ENA' s guarantee, the basic wage increase was less than 3 percent, perhaps a weak sign that the recession was having some impact. Finally, the 1981 coal settlement did show signs of concern about job opportunities and nonunion competition. The rank and file rejected an agreement that would have removed the "tax" imposed on coal purchased for resale by operators-an employer payment used to finance benefits-on the grounds that this would stimulate substitution of nonunion coal. As a result, the tax remained in the contract. A still more fundamental change would be an increase in the b coefficient. A larger b would imply that union wage settlements would become more sensitive to real business cycle conditions. For such a change to occur, at least one of three behavioral modifications would have to take place. The parties could cease to negotiate long-term contracts (or could place frequent reopeners in long-term contracts) and thereafter demonstrate substantial sensitivity in the resulting contracts of short duration to real business conditions. Or the parties could negotiate long-term contracts as they have in the past, but add to them contingency clauses sensitive to the business cycle. Thus a contract might contain a provision tying some element of compensation to profits, sales, output, or productivity (all cyclically sensitive) just as escalator clauses have tied compensation to movements in the CPI. Finally, the parties could negotiate long-term contracts as in the past, but correctly anticipate swings in business cycles and build wage responsiveness to those changes into the agreement.
The impact of a behavioral change in the c coefficient is unclear. Theoretically it is often argued that the c coefficient should be equal to 1-that is, that bargaining should take place in real terms. However, it is in the long-term escalated agreements that the coefficient has come closest to equaling 1. If contracts were to be shortened, or if escalator clauses were to be dropped, the c coefficient might fall below unity. If p is lagged, a drop in c would suggest reduced inflation momentum; last period's inflation would have a smaller effect on current inflation.
There is reason to think that old tendencies in labor-management relations were based on strong motivational factors and that previous behavior captured by b and c tends to reassert itself in the absence of external intervention. The existence of the long-term contract is intimately tied to strike avoidance. In distressed times, both parties may be especially concerned about the impact of strikes and may be able to work out cooperative relationships without long-term contracts. The procyclical nature of strike incidence has long been noted in the labor economics literature. 13 But ultimately there is no reason to suppose that long-term, inflation-sensitive contracts are a thing of the past.
To negotiate sensitive long-term contracts, either accurate forecasts must be made of the future course of economic events or contingency clauses must be added. Previous experience suggests that the one contingency clause that regularly has been built into contracts is the escalator. But contingencies based on events other than inflation have sometimes been included in contracts. Some union workers are covered by profit-sharing or other gain-sharing plans. Except in periods of concessions, unions have rarely demanded such plans, however. Apart from concessions, such plans were often established before the union came on the scene.
During periods of distress, gain-sharing arrangements, which effectively raise the b coefficient, are sometimes put in place to make Gain sharing may be accompanying demands for union participation in management. Although the firm's fortunes may depend heavily on general business cycle conditions, there can be a wide diversity of interfirm performance related to management quality and foresight. The historical record suggests that both cooperation between union and management and gain sharing are fostered during periods of distress. But such arrangements can erode when business improves.
In short, the current wave of wage concessions and renegotiations may well result in lower union wage levels-at least for a time-than past trends would have suggested. There may well be a change in the old 3-percent-plus-escalator formula toward a more modest goal. Indeed, this adaption may have already begun in the 1970s. A permanent shift to contracts of short duration seems unlikely as does a permanent increase in sensitivity to business cycle conditions (an increase in b). These conclusions assume there is no external intervention in the contract determination process and might be modified if the government did take a role in reshaping that process.
The Public Policy Question
A key issue for public policy is whether there should be some type of government intervention. In the recent past, intervention in bargaining has meant controls and guidelines. While some might argue that such intervention is still warranted-that government should reinforce the downward pressure on wages with suggested or mandatory ceilings for anti-inflationary purposes-the political prospects for such programs are nil. Nor is it evident that controls and guidelines would be desirable. But there have been suggestions that other forms of intervention should be contemplated.
Some observers have argued that long-term union contracts have contributed to wage rigidity in the United States relative to other countries. One recent proposal has called for a ban on long-term contracts and escalator clauses. 14 In terms of equation 1, such a proposal aims to raise the b coefficient. This would mean that wage inflation would be more responsive to economic slack, thus raising the efficiency of demand restraint as an anti-inflationary device. However, a ban on long-term contracts would increase the frequency of negotiations and therefore the risk of strikes. Moreover, it is not clear how such a ban would be enforced. Even if long-term contracts were made legally nonbinding, parties would still be free to maintain a "gentlemen's agreement." Union contracts were not made legally enforceable in federal courts until the Taft Twenty-two percent of employers in the BNA survey in 1977-78 reported that they have a standard policy for their nonunion employees of matching or exceeding the wage settlements they reach for their unionized workers. Sixty-three percent indicated that they "reviewed" the relation between union and nonunion pay within their organizations, although 69 percent responded that they had no formal policy for adjusting nonunion wages based on their union settlements. Large firms, which contain a disproportionate fraction of the work force, seemed more likely to be influenced by union pay outcomes within their firms than small ones.
The limited evidence available suggests that union contract concessions will have a significant impact on the pay of nonunion workers in the enterprise receiving the concession. To some extent, nonunion employers will be influenced by union wage concessions-and union settlements generally-through their survey methodology. Purely nonunion employers, however, are less likely to be influenced by union concessions than those that are partially unionized.
Although the current rash of union wage concessions has past precedents, it is still an unusual episode. Thus there is danger in simply extrapolating from previous behavior established during "normal" periods. Perry has offered a model in which wage-adjustment "norms" develop in the labor market, and these may be influenced by special events or unusual economic developments.20 Because of the wide publicity given to recent union wage concessions in major industries, it is possible to argue that wage norms will shift in response. Unfortunately, reverse arguments are also easy to concoct. It could be argued that the concessions have been reported as unusual responses to exceptional circumstances and thus will not be seen as guides outside the distressed industries. Because the concept of norms is elusive, norm shifts cannot be readily predicted in advance.
Nonunion pay is rarely determined by explicit contract. However, it has become recognized in the economics literature that contract-like The wage concessions themselves will have only a limited effect since the number of workers directly covered by concessions was probably less than two million. Even if it is assumed that these workers receive no wage increases in 1982 (an exaggeration because some concession contracts provide for increases) and that spillovers double the number of workers affected, the impact on overall wage adjustments is small. If four million workers were to receive no increases while others received an average 8 percent, the average adjustment would be reduced to about 7.6 percent.
Obviously it is possible that compensation per hour will rise by much less than the 8 percent forecast for 1982. However, if that occurs it will either be because price inflation turned out to be substantially less than that forecast or because a substantial break from past wage behavior occurred-a norm shift. It can be said that there was no evidence of a sharp break from past behavior in the union sector during 1981 and early 1982. Table 6 presents 
Discussion
ALBERT REES suggested that the paper should have given more emphasis to two noncyclical factors in interpreting the recent round of contract concessions. The first is deregulation, which has put direct pressure on both the trucking and airline industries. The second is the secular rise in foreign competition, which has directly and indirectly threatened the steel, automobile, durable goods, and other industries. James Duesenberry recalled John Dunlop's analysis of wage reductions in the early 1930s, which showed that product market pressure, rather than high unemployment per se, was most closely associated with wage declines. Wages fell earliest and fastest in sectors in which product market problems were most acute, rather than in sectors that had generally high unemployment rates.
A major focus of the discussion was on the magnitude and significance of growing wage differentials between unionized and nonunionized workers. Martin Baily noted that, if an earlier historical relation between union and nonunion wage levels was to be restored, either union wages must slow or nonunion wages accelerate. The former appears to be occurring, but if this represents a restoration of a previous equilibrium, there is little likelihood of spillover that would generate comparable moderation in nonunion wages. Michael Wachter agreed with this analysis. He noted that union wages have typically risen relative to nonunion wages during economic downturns and fallen relatively during expansions. But the 1970s were an exception to this pattern, in large measure because union wages were indexed to the consumer price index, which rose rapidly over the decade. The current recession seems to be restoring the historical relation of wages primarily by reductions in union wages. Duesenberry disagreed with Wachter's cyclical analysis of unionnonunion wage differentials and argued that there has been a secular rise in the differential since the depression, with breaks in this pattern only during the Second World War and the Korean and Vietnam wars. This means there is no "historical" relation between union and nonunion wages to which to return. Jeffrey Sachs noted that the growth in the union-nonunion differential has been an international phenomenon over 202 the past seven years. He attributed this trend to the oil price shocks and the productivity slowdown, both of which shrank the scope for real wage increases. These shocks were rapidly translated into lower wages in more competitive markets for labor, but not in the unionized sector.
John Taylor argued that two types of concessions considered by Mitchell were quite different in their economic implications. First, unions negotiating a regularly scheduled wage contract may grant concessions in the form of lower than expected wage increases. Second, unions may agree to unscheduled reopenings of contracts in order to grant concessions. Only the latter type of concession reduces the rigidity of the current wage-setting process, and it is this rigidity that makes inflation so sticky. George Perry observed that Taylor's distinction was less important in a more general view of what caused inflation inertia. Even at normal reopening periods, settlements could be influenced by a range of developments and expectations. If these settlements now turn out to be unexpectedly moderate, it could help the whole disinflation process by influencing wage setting elsewhere. Alan Blinder wondered whether changes in the fraction of workers covered by escalator clauses are a barometer of wage developments generally. Mitchell said that changes in that fraction mainly reflect changes in the relative importance of industries in which escalators are already prevalent. Rees added that it is more common to make various kinds of adjustments to escalators rather than simply to abandon them. Recently the frequency of escalator adjustments has been reduced in some contracts. Mitchell noted that when concessions are made, unions have generally deferred COLA adjustments that are otherwise due while preserving the COLA provision for the future.
Several participants commented on the possibility that the current round of union concessions presaged a rapid deceleration in average wage inflation. Duesenberry noted that the rate of growth in average hourly earnings dropped sharply between fall 1981 and spring 1982. On the other hand, Mitchell reported that surveys of firms' intended wage increases were only 1 to 2 percentage points lower in March than they had been in September. Wachter suggested that the major union "givebacks" did not provide much inducement for nonunion workers to make similar concessions because nonunion workers had not shared in abovenormal wage increases in the 1970s. On the basis of recent experience, William Nordhaus reasoned that, as unemployment rose above a thresh-old level, it might have a growing impact on wage deceleration, perhaps because the median union worker becomes personally threatened by unemployment. Martin Feldstein added that it might not be the level of unemployment as much as the expected duration of high unemployment that is having the deflationary effect.
